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Abstract 
Foreign  direct  investment  has  been  important  in  the  economic  growth  and  global 
economic integration of developing countries over the last decades. Both Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, especially the latter, have been part of this development with increasing 
inflows of FDI and greater foreign participation in their economies. However, Indonesia 
has been an outlier within the region, with lower inflows of FDI than other countries, 
especially in manufacturing, and with lower inflows than could be expected from its size 
and  other  country  characteristics.  The  inflows  of  FDI  that  have  taken  place  have 
benefited Indonesia and we use the Asian experience to provide some suggestions as to 
what  measures  would  increase  FDI.  A  relatively  poor  business  environment  with 
inefficient institutions seems to be an important explanation behind the low inflows of 
FDI. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a key aspect of increased globalization in recent 
decades.  The  growth  in  FDI  has  been  higher  than  growth  in  international  trade; 
multinational firms have come to account for about 10 percent of world output and 30 
percent  of  world  exports;  and  a  large  share  of  new  technologies  is  developed  and 
controlled by these firms.  
FDI has played, and continues to play, a large role in Asian development. China is 
one of the world‘s largest recipients of FDI and Japan is a major source. Some countries 
in  the region,  such as  Singapore, have based  much of  their development  strategy on 
reliance on foreign multinational firms. Finally, Asia is a prime home to multinational 
firms‘ cross-country networks, where different affiliates of a firm produce different parts 
and components, or assemble such parts and components imported from abroad. 
FDI often requires coordinating complicated operations over long distances: input 
goods and services need to be shipped between different branches of the multinational 
firm;  and  coordination  and  supervision  requires  visits  by  staff  and  a  steady  flow  of 
information. It is clear that the complexities of operations across national borders put 
large requirements on the host country economic environment. Countries differ in their 
ability to attract FDI, depending on characteristics such as infrastructure, trade regimes,  
labor force skills, and institutional quality. 
It should therefore not come as a surprise that inflows of FDI differ substantially 
among countries in Asia. Indonesia is a country where FDI inflows have been relatively 
modest, and lower than what would be expected from the size of the country. This paper   3 
tries  to  explain  the  low  inflows  of  FDI  by  relating  the  situation  in  Indonesia  to  the 
experience of other countries in the region.  Asia is a heterogeneous region and countries 
differ in many aspects. This provides a possibility to evaluate the determinants of FDI. 
What factors are typically the most important ones in explaining FDI inflows into East 
Asia? 
The  paper  starts  with  a  description  of  FDI  in  East  Asia,  divided  between 
Northeast and Southeast Asia, and continues with a discussion on the main determinants 
to FDI in East Asia. Section three includes an analysis of FDI inflows to Indonesia where 
we compare actual inflows of FDI from different sources with inflows predicted from 
country characteristics. We continue with a survey of the literature on the impact of FDI 
on  the  Indonesian  economy.  FDI  has  benefitted  the  Indonesian  economy  in  various 
respects and a natural conclusion is that Indonesia would benefit from higher inflows. We 
then continue with a policy discussion where, on the basis of the previous section on 
determinants of FDI in East Asia, we examine and discuss possible policies to increase 
inflows of FDI to Indonesia. The paper ends with a concluding section. 
 
FDI IN THE GROWTH OF DEVELOPING EAST ASIA 
  The  three  main  regions  of  the  developing  world,  Asia,  except  Japan,  Latin 
America, and Africa, have fared very differently since the middle of the 20
th Century.  As 
late as only four decades ago, Latin America had the highest per capita income, there was 
a good deal of optimism about Africa, and Asia was far behind Latin America.  By the 
early  2000s,  Northeast  Asian  countries  had  about  caught  up  with  Latin  America,   4 
Southeast  Asian  countries  were  not  far  behind,  and  some  had  far  outstripped  Latin 
America. Incomes in both groups of Asian countries far surpassed those in Africa.
1  
Most studies find FDI to have been a source of the rapid growth  of some Asian 
countries.
2 That has been the case for most of the countries in the region, although less so 
and later for the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, which initially followed the Japanese 
model of restrictions on foreign-controlled firms and only began catching up to the other 
countries in the region after 1990.  
As can be seen in Chart 1, inflows of FDI to East Asia have risen since the 1970s, 
with interruptions, and accelerated after the opening of China around  1990. The inflow 
was set back briefly in the mid-1970s, again in the mid-1980s, and by the 1997 crisis, and 
then again, by the troubles of the IT industry  in the early 2000s, a major beneficiary of 
the FDI capital inflow. The current financial crisis  has left its  mark, although through 
2008, the  aggregate flow to the region  had remained remarkably resilient. The inflow 
declined in 2009, but remained close to the highest levels. 
 
        -- Chart 1 about here -- 
 
A crude measure of the role of inward FDI in different East Asian countries is the ratio of 
the inward stock to GDP, shown in Table 1.  Among the developing regions of the world, 
Asia became a major  destination for flows of  FDI well before other regions did.  The 
inward stock of FDI in 1980, for example, was about 42 percent of GDP in  Northeast 
Asia and 9.5 percent in Southeast Asia when it was 8 percent of GDP in Africa and 6.5 
                                                 
1 See the Penn World Tables for data on per capita incomes. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
2 See, for example, among many, the country studies in Ito and Krueger (2000), Urata, Chia, and Kimura 
(2006), and Zhang (2001).   5 
percent in South America. By 1995, Southeast Asia had caught up with Northeast Asia, 
and the ratios to GDP were 22 percent in Southeast Asia, 21 percent in Northeast Asia, 
15.6 percent in Africa, and 8.6 percent in South America.  
A major part of the growth of FDI in the region was the growth in China.  China 
has been the developing world‘s largest recipient of FDI in the last decade (UNCTAD, 
2009,  Appendix  Table  B-2).  However,  the  growth  in  FDI  to  China  started  from  a 
situation with almost no existing FDI. Despite the large flows, China‘s stock of inward 
FDI relative to its size, measured by income, is still not very high by Asian standards.   
The largest ratios were those for the two entrepôts, Hong Kong, where a large 
share of the FDI inflows presumably ended up in China, and which we have combined 
with China in the table, and Singapore, in which, as in Hong Kong, much of the FDI 
financed  productive  assets  that  were  located  in  other  Asian  countries.  They  were 
followed by Vietnam (although we consider that country‘s published ratios doubtful), 
Thailand and Malaysia. Indonesia has a substantially lower ratio of FDI compared to 
these three neighboring countries. With a ratio of about 13 percent, Indonesia is similar to 
the Philippines and to the latecomers to FDI inflows, Taiwan and Korea. 
 
        -- Table 1 about here -- 
 
An alternative measure of the importance of FDI to a country  the ratio to capital 
formation. This is shown for different  periods in Table 2. The ratios of FDI to total 
capital formation have been higher in Southeast than in Northeast Asia since 1980. In 
2005-2009, the ratio was more than twice as high. FDI flows were very high in Hong   6 
Kong and Singapore relative to  capital  formation,  again  because much of the capital 
formation financed by the FDI took place in other locations. The ratios are relatively high 
also  in  Vietnam,  Malaysia  and  Thailand.  The  ratio  of  FDI  to  capital  formation  has 
increased over time in Indonesia: from about one percent in 1980-84 to eight percent in 
2005-2009. This increase notwithstanding, the ratio is lower in Indonesia than in all the 
other countries except Taiwan and Korea. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
Another indicator of the extent of inward FDI, calculated by UNCTAD for 2005 
and earlier years, is what is referred to as ―transnationality‖, a combination of several 
ratios  of  inward  FDI  activity  to  country  characteristics,  including  FDI  inflows  as  a 
percent of gross fixed capital formation, 2003-2005, inward FDI stocks as a percent of 
GDP  in  2005,  value  added  in  foreign  affiliates  as  a  percent  of  GDP  in  2005,  and 
employment in foreign affiliates as a percent of total employment in 2005.  A high figure 
on the transnationality index means a large presence of inward FDI. The average figure 
for developing countries in East Asia is approximately 25.5, and ranges from 104 and 65 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, to about 8.5 in Indonesia, the least transnational of the 
North- and Southeast Asian countries by this measure.   
 
WHY HAS SO MUCH FDI GONE TO EAST ASIA? 
A  fundamental  criterion  for  attracting  FDI  is  that  the  host  country  welcomes  such 
investments. This has not always been the case in East Asia. Developing countries  for a   7 
long time used import substitution to encourage formation and growth of domestic firms. 
A natural part of this strategy was to restrict access of foreign multinational firms to the 
domestic market and to use other methods to acquire foreign technology. Japan used this 
strategy successfully, and that success had a strong impact on development strategies in 
other countries across East Asia in the 1960‘s and 70‘s.  
Some  Asian  countries  eventually  experimented  with  a  different  development 
strategy,  including  a  stronger  reliance  on  foreign  multinational  firms.  Singapore 
pioneered this development. When Singapore was expelled from Malaya in 1965 it lost 
most of its previous domestic market on the Malaysian peninsular and its: 
 
―…original  economic  strategy,  which  was  reflected  in  its  first  …development 
plan, became inoperative…Clearly, import replacement made no sense for a city-
state….the most rapid economic progress seemed to lie in industrialization…The 
question was how to bring it about.  The decision was made to encourage FDI…‖ 
(Krause, Koh, and Yuan, 1987, p. 3). 
 
The  economic  success  of  Singapore  inspired  other  countries  in  East  Asia  to 
liberalize  their  trade  regimes  and  to  encourage  the  entrance  of  foreign  multinational 
firms. The FDI regimes still differ among East Asian countries, with some being more 
open than others, but all countries have become more open to FDI over time (Brooks and 
Hill, 2004). The exact reason for a more liberal FDI regime varied among different East 
Asian countries. In some it was an attempt to augment domestic savings, in others to   8 
encourage  technology  transfer  or  to  get  access  to  international  markets  for  exports 
(Dobson, 1997).  
As previously mentioned, openness to FDI is a necessary condition for attracting 
foreign multinational firms, but it is not sufficient. The host country needs to provide an 
economic environment that is attractive for multinational firms. One set of indicators of 
the environment for business in general is the World Bank‘s calculations of the ease of 
doing business,  published annually. The major regions  of the developing world  have 
differed  substantially  over  the  years  with  respect  to  the  ease  of  doing  business,  a 
characteristic that summarizes many of the obstacles and advantages of the country‘s 
institutions. The average rankings of the four main developing regions, with low numbers 
representing relative ease of doing business, are summarized in Table 3.  Northeast Asia 
was the easiest region for doing business and its average rank has been falling (that is, 
improving).  It  is  followed  by  Southeast  Asia,  the  second  highest  of  the  developing 
regions, then by Latin America and finally by Africa, the most difficult environment for 
business. The margin by which East Asia leads the other developing areas has increased 
over the period. 
Looking  at  individual  country  rankings  for  the  quality  of  the  business 
environment  rankings  within  Asia,  it  is  seen  that  Singapore  is  ranked  highest  of  all 
countries  included  in  the  survey  and  Hong  Kong  is  ranked  as  number  three.  Korea, 
Thailand  and  Malaysia  have  also  quite  low  ranks  and  are  considered  to  have  good 
business environments. Indonesia does not come out favorably in the ranking: it was 
ranked as number 122 out of 183 included countries. China, Vietnam and the Philippines   9 
are also  considered to  have relatively poor business  environments  but  only the latter 
country is ranked worse than Indonesia. 
 
      -- Table 3 about here -- 
 
A  feature  of  the  recent  development  of  East  Asian  economies  has  been  their 
participation in global production networks of multinational firms from the developed 
countries, particularly U.S. and Japanese firms (Athukorala, 2005; Zhou and Lall, 2005). 
Multinational firms locate different parts of the production process in different  Asian 
countries  to  increase  efficiency  and  reduce  costs.  One  consequence  of  this 
―fragmentation‖ of multinational firms‘ production is to reduce the importance of country 
size in the location of production, since a small country can participate by specializing in 
a single stage of production for eventual use in many markets. 
A series of papers by Ando and Kimura, summarized in Ando, Arndt, and Kimura 
(2006),  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  growth  of  trade  in  machinery  parts  and 
components, and contrasts that trend in Asian trade with its absence in Latin American 
trade. When countries are arrayed in the order of importance of machinery and machinery 
parts and components in their exports, seven Asian countries are above the median, and 
only  one,  Indonesia,  is  below.  Among  Latin  American  countries,  only  one  country, 
Mexico, showed a high ratio and nine a low ratio. Athukorala (2005, p. 9) shows that East 
Asia‘s share of global trade in parts and components increased from 34.5 percent in 1990 
to 39.5 percent in 2000. The bulk of trade in parts and  components is conducted by 
multinational firms.   10 
Electronics  has  been  the  most  important  sector  for  international  production 
networks. International electronic firms were already in the 1960‘ and 70‘s looking at 
possibilities to locate labor intensive parts of the production in foreign countries. East 
Asian countries were the prime location for these firms. For instance, Texas Instruments, 
and  National  Semiconducters,  located  production  in  Singapore  already  in  the  1960s 
(Sjöholm, 2003a). They were attracted to Singapore by subsidies but also by an efficient 
bureaucracy that, for instance, enabled Texas  Instruments to start production 50 days 
after their investment decision (Huff 1994, p. 325).  
Malaysia also became an important destination of foreign electronic companies at 
a relatively early date. One important location was the southern Malaysian state Johor. 
This development was partly a result of strong historically links with Singapore but it was 
also made possible through liberalizations of trade and border procedures in Malaysia and 
through investments in infrastructure on both sides of the border (Sjöholm, 2003a, p. 
109). MNEs were able to ship goods back and forward between plants on both sides of 
the  border.  Similar  networks  have  over  time  been  spreading  to,  for  instance,  China, 
Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam. 
The  cost  of  production  is  particularly  important  for  location  of  vertically 
integrated  production  networks,  and  the  cost  depends  on  a  host  of  factors  including 
wages, productivity, infrastructure, tariffs, and taxes. The authors in Ando et al. (2006) 
associate  success  in  participating  in  these  production-sharing  arrangements  among 
countries to FDI environments in host countries, especially to the presence of supporting 
infrastructure, including ―costly communications and coordination infrastructure‖ (p. 7).     11 
Labor  costs  depend  on  productivity  as  well  as  on  wage  rates.  Productivity  is 
highly  dependent  on  the  educational  level  of  the  workforce  and  several  papers  find 
education and skills of the workforce to be important in multinational firms‘ location 
decision.
3 The level of education varies, of course, with the type of production, but even 
relatively simple manufacturing typically requires at least basic literacy and numeracy. 
For more sophisticated production, the skill requirement of the workforce is higher.
4   
Many  East  Asian  countries  were  early  leaders  in  the  education  of  their 
populations. They have, for instance, since the 1960s had high levels of completion of 
secondary education compared to Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, and high levels 
of completion of tertiary education relative to all developing areas except Latin America 
(Barro and Lee, 2010, Table 3). This early lead in education may have been part of the 
reason for the early attractiveness of some of these countries to investors.  One should 
note, however, that the level of education differs within East Asia with a relatively higher 
level in Northeast than in Southeast Asia (Booth, 1999a and 1999b). 
  A number of studies try to identify  additional determinants of FDI. For instance, 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) find a general negative effect of corruption on FDI in developing 
countries. Woo and Heo (2009) examines corruption in eight Asian countries and find 
also a negative effect on FDI inflows.  Hines (1995), in a study on U .S. FDI, and Wei 
(1997), in a study on OECD, arrive at similar findings. The negative effect of corruption 
on FDI might seem like a paradox considering that large inflows of FDI and high levels 
of corruption coincides in many East Asian countries. One explanation is that ot her 
                                                 
3 See World Bank (2007, p. 180-181) for a discussion of skills and FDI in East Asia. 
4 It is also worth noting that several studies find that a more educated workforce increases the positive 
impact of FDI on the host economy. For instance, Zhang (2001) and Blomström and Kokko (2003a) stress 
that the growth effect of FDI is higher in East Asia than in Latin America because education is superior in 
the former region.   12 
country characteristics, such as cheap labor and large markets, make up for the negative 
effect of corruption. Another explanation might be the nature of corruption in East Asia. 
Rodriguez et al. (2005) examines corruption from two dimensions: pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness. High pervasiveness of corruption makes it institutionalized and predictable 
whereas arbitrarily corruption increases uncertainty. Corruption in East Asia tends to be 
of a predictable sort: firms tend to know who to bribe, and once the payment is done the 
firm will be free from making similar payments to other actors. Lee and Oh (2007) argues 
that  this  predictability  is  especially  important  for  foreign  multinational  firms  with 
comparable poor knowledge about local conditions: arbitrariness and uncertainty whether 
bribery will be favorable hurts foreign firms, with relatively poor knowledge of local 
conditions, more than local firms.  
The  ―Corruption  Perceptions  Index‖  published  each  year  by  Transparency 
International suggests that there have been persistent differences among the regions in the 
perception of the prevalence of corruption (Table 4).  The index is constructed from 
surveys and ratings by risk agencies and country analysts, combined to fit into a scale 
ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the highest level of corruption and 10 the 
lowest.  Among  the  developing  regions,  Northeast  Asia  has  been  perceived  as  least 
corrupt  since  2001,  followed  by  Southeast  Asia.  Africa  has  been  perceived  as  most 
corrupt. The ordering of the regions in this respect matches the ordering  in ratios of 
inward FDI to GDP. 
With respect to the prevalence of corruption, figures on individual countries in 
Table 4 suggest that there are three groups of countries: Singapore and Hong Kong with 
low  perceived  corruption;  Taiwan,  Korea  and  Malaysia  with  intermediate  levels  of   13 
corruption; and China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam with relatively high 
level. Indonesia had the highest level of corruption in 2001 but has made some progress 
and corruption is in 2009 seen to be similar to the level in Vietnam and lower than in the 
Philippines. 
 
      -- Table 4 about here -- 
 
Other studies also highlight the importance of institutions. Chantasasawat et al. 
(2004) examines FDI to eight East Asian countries between 1985 and 2001. Their results 
suggest that various institutional factors are among the most important determinants to 
FDI. For instance, low corporate taxes, low levels of corruption, and a high degree of 
openness to the international economy increase FDI. One explanation of the relationship 
lies in the above-mentioned production networks. Such networks rely on low tariffs and 
low  transaction  costs  to  be  able  to  ship  parts  and  components  economically  among 
affiliates in different countries.  
It is a major task for a developing country to implement all the policies discussed 
above. A number of East Asian countries have tried to use export processing zones (EPZ) 
as a way to address this difficulty. The idea behind these zones is that foreign firms are 
attracted  to  certain  geographic  locations  in  a  country  where  improvements  in 
infrastructure can be concentrated and where the firms often are given special treatment 
in terms of taxes and regulations. Typical advantages of locating in EPS‘s include, lower 
levels of import and export restrictions, less restrictive labor requirements, lower taxes,   14 
liberal ownership regulations, liberal foreign exchange regulations, and access to superior 
infrastructure and communication technologies (Madani, 1999).  
Countries  like  Malaysia  and  Thailand  have  for  a  relatively  long  time  relied 
heavily on export processing zones. Other countries, such as Vietnam, have started later 
but also been relatively successful. China is perhaps the most successful example where 
such zones where instrumental in the country‘s rapid growth. Foreign firms were coming 
in large numbers to the four zones opened in 1980 and later to new zones that opened up 
at rapid pace in the coastal provinces. As a result, foreign firms share of export rose from 
1 percent in 1985 to more than 50 percent in 2005 (Hofman, Zhao and Ishihara, 2007).  
It seems that EPZ‘s are particularly important in countries with poor institutions. 
In those instances, EPZs will allow foreign multinational firms to overcome some of the 
domestic  regulations  and  constraints.  As  countries  develop,  the  situation  in  the 
surrounding economy tends to converge to the EPZ‘s and the role of EPS‘s tends to 
decline. 
To  sum  up  the  above  discussion,  in  all  the  characteristics  described  here  as 
attractive to investment by multinational firms, East Asian countries as a group have 
been, for at least several decades, superior to other developing regions.  That has been the 
case for the education of the labor force, the control of corruption, the atmosphere for 
conducting business, the reliability of the infrastructure needed for coordinating chains of 
supply and production,  and the willingness  to  make changes  in  institutions  to  attract 
foreign firms.  The result has been a higher presence of foreign multinationals than in 
other areas of the developing world.   
   15 
INDONESIA AS A RECIPIENT OF FDI 
We have showed that FDI inflows have been large to most countries in East Asia but 
relatively modest to Indonesia. Another way of describing Indonesia‘s record in attracting 
inward FDI is by comparing inward stocks over time with what might be predicted from 
equations relating the expected inward stock to several possible determinants of inflow of 
FDI.  
In one of these calculations, the variables used for the prediction are the real GDP 
of the country five years earlier, the growth in real per capita GDP in the previous five 
years,  and  a  measure  of  the  openness  of  the  economy‘s  trade  policy  we  refer  to  as 
―Residual  Openness.‖  The  measure  of  ―residual  openness‖  is  the  residual  from  an 
equation relating a standard measure of openness, the ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP, to a country‘s population and land area.  It takes account of the fact that larger 
countries, in terms of both population and land area, trade less, relative to GDP, than 
small countries with the same degree of deliberate trade restriction. It is an attempt to 
come closer to trade policy than a simple ratio of trade to output.   
An example of such a regression is one for the nominal inward FDI stock in a 
country in year t based on estimating equation (1): 
 
  (1) 
     
The actual inward stock of FDI in Indonesia in 1985 as reported in the UNCTAD 
data base (from www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) was 31 percent of the stock predicted by 
the equation and reached 40 percent of the predicted stock by 2005, when actual levels   16 
for four East Asian countries were higher than predicted levels and only the Philippines 
had a lower ratio of actual to predicted FDI stock (Table 5).  
 
      --Table 5 about here-- 
 
The data on aggregate stocks and flows of FDI to individual countries are subject 
to many problems of measurement and interpretation. For some countries, part of the FDI 
inflow does not add to the productive assets of the nominal destination country, but flows 
through to other countries, where the labor and physical capital financed by the flow end 
up. That is the case, for example for inflows to Hong Kong and Singapore. In other cases, 
the  inflows  never  reach  the  supposed  destination  country,  except  as  notations  on 
accounting statements.   
For  FDI  from  the  United  States,  more  information  is  available  about  the 
composition and characteristics of the FDI flows and stocks. The main advantage is that 
we can the study real activities of multinational affiliates rather than looking at financial 
flows. Predictions of the levels of total employment in U.S. affiliates and employment in 
manufacturing affiliates can be made, based on the same independent variables as for the 
total  stock  of  inward  FDI,  and  these  can  be  compared  with  actual  surveys  of  U.S. 
multinationals.   
Employment  in  all  U.S.  affiliates  in  Indonesia  ranged  from  about  half  the 
predicted level to a peak of 90 percent (not shown).  For no other Northeast or Southeast 
Asian country was the underprediction of U.S. affiliate employment consistently greater.  
For U.S. firms in manufacturing, their employment in Indonesia was only 11 percent of   17 
the expected number in 1985, but it increased steadily to over 80 percent of the expected 
amount in 2005, close to the median.   
In  contrast,  the  level  of  physical  capital  in  U.S.  affiliates  in  Indonesia,  as 
represented by net property, plant, and equipment, was far above the predicted values in 
all the years from 1985 through 2005.  That contrast is, as discussed below, explained by 
the  division  of  U.S.  FDI  into  investment  in  manufacturing  and  in  other  industries.  
Employment  in  U.S.  manufacturing  affiliates  in  Indonesia  fell  far  short  of  predicted 
values, as little as 11 percent in 1985, but gradually came closer to the prediction by 
2005.  It was only a fraction of the affiliate manufacturing employment in such small 
economies as Hong Kong and Singapore, until a more than doubling from 2000 to 2005 
brought it above both of those. 
  The composition of U.S. firms‘ employment in Indonesia was very different from 
that in other East Asian countries (Table 6). The share in mining was much higher, at 
least over 23 percent, although data suppression conceals the actual level.  In no other 
country  in  the  region  was  the  share  over  2  percent.    The  share  in  Machinery  is 
particularly low, at less than half of one percent, while in other countries, except the 
Philippines, it ranged from 2 to 6 percent.  Computers and electronic products accounted 
for less than 1 percent of employment in US firms‘ affiliates, while the shares in the other 
countries ranged from 3.5 percent in Hong Kong to over 50 percent in Malaysia.  In 
general, the investment in Indonesia from the United States avoided the manufacturing 
industries in which technology was important, with the exception of Chemicals, probably 
drawn to the country by the petroleum investments. Furthermore, the low share of US 
FDI in electronics suggests that Indonesia is not part of US production networks.   18 
   
          --Table 6 about here-- 
 
The  omission  of  Indonesia  from  U.S.  multinationals‘  production  networks  is 
supported in Table 7 by the low share of sales outside the host country in total sales of 
manufacturing affiliates in Indonesia.  U.S. manufacturing affiliates in Indonesia made 
about  20  percent  of  their  sales  outside  the  country,  while  manufacturing  affiliates  in 
Taiwan and Thailand made over 45% of their sales abroad and those in the other East 
Asian countries except China and Korea made over 50% of their sales outside their home 
markets.  
 
        --Table 7 about here— 
 
We  did  also  examine  inflows  of  FDI  from  countries  where  similar  data  on 
activities in foreign affiliates are available. The results above of lower inflows of FDI 
than  what  could  be  expected  were  largely  confirmed.
5  For instance,  German FDI in 
Indonesia was lower than would be expected from a prediction based on FDI in all 
developing countries, whereas employment in Japanese-owned manufacturing plants in 
Indonesia was close to predicted levels. 
The variables included in the predictions described above refer to Indonesia as a 
maket for the investing firms and therefore capture mostly market seeking FDI. However, 
our results are confirmed in other studies using broader sets of variables that reflect also 
Indonesia‘s  attractiveness  as  a  location  for  export-oriented  production.  For  instance,  
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Indonesia exhibits underperformance in terms of FDI inflows, compared to what one 
would expect from country characteristics, according to UNCTAD (2010). They rank 
Indonesia as number 119 out of 141 countries in terms of FDI inflows. This figure could 
be compared to what UNCTAD refers to as the potential inflows of FDI, which is based 
on 12 different economic and policy variables, where Indonesia is ranked as number 85. 
The history of FDI in Indonesia has thus been one of relatively low participation 
of foreign firms, as compared with their role in other countries in the region.  Indonesia is 
not the country most closed to foreign firms, but it ranks low as a location for FDI in 
general and for participation in chains of production organized by foreign firms. The 
modest inflow of FDI to Indonesia stands in sharp contrast to the neighboring countries 
which are all characterized by a heavy concentration of MNEs.  
 
THE EFFECT OF FDI ON THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 
It  would  be  in  Indonesia‘s  interest  to  increase  inflows  of  FDI  only  if  such  inflows 
benefits the country. We therefore briefly survey the literature on the effects of FDI in 
Indonesia. Table A1 in the appendix shows a number of studies that look at different 
effects of FDI.  
The  empirical  literature  shows  surprisingly  consistent  benefits  of  FDI  to 
Indonesia.  For  instance,  foreign  firms  bring  in  new  production  processes  or  start  to 
produce  new  products  benefits  the country  and  will  manifest  itself in  relatively  high 
productivity in foreign firms. A number of studies show that this is indeed the case: 
foreign firms  have higher  labor productivity  and higher total  factor productivity  than 
local firms. Moreover, not only the level but also the growth of productivity is high in   20 
foreign firms. Finally, all of the listed studies find productivity to be high even after 
controlling for various firm characteristics, such as size and capital intensities.  
Previous  literature  also  shows  a  clear  difference  in  export  intensities:  foreign 
firms are substantially more integrated in the international economy through exports. This 
is  not  surprising  but  a  result  found  in  most  countries.  One  interesting  finding  on 
Indonesia is that even foreign firms that start producing only for the Indonesian market 
are more able to switch to export than are local firms. 
Foreign-owned  establishments  in  Indonesia  pay  also  higher  wages  than 
domestically owned establishments, even given the educational level of their labor forces. 
They also pay a higher premium the higher the level of education. Foreign firms‘ entry 
thus not only increases wages, but also increases the returns to education and encourages 
workers‘  investments  in  additional  education.  Accordingly,  foreign  acquisition  of  an 
Indonesian manufacturing plant results in higher wages for the plant‘s employees. Hence, 
foreign ownership and foreign acquisition increase wages relative to domestic ownership. 
A similar story applies to growth in employment. Foreign firms have relatively 
high growth in employment and foreign acquisitions of domestic firms increase growth in 
employment, despite that foreign-owned firms are relatively large and large firms tend to 
have relatively low growth rates in employment. 
The studies in Table A1 suggest that foreign firms have high productivity and 
export, pay high wages, and show a high growth in employment. If local firms benefit 
from FDI, it is clear that there are gains to the country from hosting foreign multinational 
firms, but the benefits are less clear if local firms are instead hurt by the presence of 
foreign firms. The effects of FDI on local firms are often expressed as spillovers. Positive   21 
spillovers could for instance arise from transfer of technologies from foreign to domestic 
firms or from expanding markets for domestic suppliers of intermediate goods. Negative 
spillovers could result from increased competition which forces domestic firms out of 
business or forces them to operate at a lower scale of production. 
Table A2 in the appendix summarize existing studies on spillovers in Indonesia.
6 
Most studies focus on the effect on productivity but there are also two studies on wage 
spillovers. Almost all of the studies find evidence of positive spillovers: local firms 
benefit from the presence of foreign firms within the industry or region. For productivity, 
the positive effect is likely to come from technology spillovers, new technologies and 
knowledge that are made available for domestic firms, and from increased competition, a 
pressure to improve to secure market shares and survival. For wages, the positive effect 
of FDI is likely to be the result both of increased productivity through the discussed 
spillovers, and thought an increased demand for labor. Since the foreign plants also have 
higher productivity and pay higher wages than local firms, the two factors together imply 
that higher foreign presence raises the general productivity and wage level in a province 
and industry. 
 
POLICY DISCUSSION: HOW COULD INDONESIA ATTRACT MORE FDI? 
If  faster  growth  is  an  important  goal  of  economic  policy,  it  would  seem  to  be  in 
Indonesia‘s interest to increase inflows of FDI considering the benefits FDI brings in 
terms of productivity growth, higher wages and strong employment growth. However, the 
Indonesian  attitude  towards  FDI  has  always  been  rather  ambivalent.  Indonesia‘s 
continuing ambivalence toward FDI is reflected in the fact that in each year‘s review of 
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FDI policy in UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report in the last few years, some added 
restrictions  in  Indonesia  are  mentioned.  For  example,  in  the  2008  WIR,  ―Indonesia 
extended the list of business activities that are closed and partially restricted to foreign 
investment‖  (pp.  52-53).  In  the  2009  WIR,  ―In  Indonesia…the  Ministry  of 
Communications issued a decree barring foreigners from investing in the construction 
and  ownership  of  wireless  communications  towers‖  (p.  56),  and  in  the  2010  WIR, 
―…some new restrictions to engage in certain activities were introduced (e.g. in India and 
Indonesia).‖  (p.  39).  Indonesia  was  the  only  country  mentioned  as  introducing  new 
restrictions in all three years.  
Fiscal incentives are often mentioned when policies to attract FDI are discussed in 
Indonesia. Such incentives have been used in other parts of East Asia, both in the form of 
favorable tax treatments and direct subsidies. Fiscal incentives can only be justified if the 
benefit to the host economy is larger than the cost of the fiscal incentives. Many authors 
argue  that  this  is  seldom  the  case  (Blomström  and  Kokko,  2003b).  Moreover,  most 
studies suggest that fiscal incentives are not important in MNE‘s  localization decisions 
(Morisset and Pirnia, 1999). One serious problem is that fiscal incentive schemes are  
difficult to administer and often lead to corruption (Morisset, 2003). The past and present 
problems with the Indonesian Investment Promotion Agency (BKMP) suggest that such 
fiscal incentive policies run the risk of being relatively inefficient also in Indonesia. 
It is therefore more fruitful to address the general business climate in Indonesia. 
Our previous discussion on determinants of FDI in East Asia suggested that high levels of 
education,  good  institutions,  and  openness  to  trade  are  all  important  factors  in  the 
location decision of multinational firms.    23 
Education  is  very  poor  in  Indonesia.  The  exception  is  enrolment  in  primary 
education which was substantially expanded in the 1970‘s with the use of public revenues 
from oil. However, enrolment in tertiary and secondary education has been lower than in 
most other countries in East Asia (Sjöholm, 2005). Moreover, there are signs that the 
quality of education is relatively poor (Jones and Hagul, 2001; Welch, 2007).  
To illustrate the situation, Table 8 shows that educational attainment, as of 2010, 
is  lower, on average, than in any of the other East Asian countries discussed here. The 
proportion of the population 15 and over with no schooling is far above that in any other 
of the countries. Only 1.4 percent of the population has completed tertiary education and 
the average member of the population has had only a little over 6 years of education, the 
lowest level among these countries. Only in the completion of secondary education is 
Indonesia ahead of a few of the other countries. The drop from the proportion completing 
secondary education to the proportion completing tertiary education is 94 percent, the 
largest among the nine countries. Either little tertiary education has been pursued or many 
of those that have pursued it have left the country. 
 
      --Table 8 about here-- 
 
Improved  education  is  important  for  attracting  FDI  but  it  will  also  affect 
Indonesia‘s absorptive capacity; the better the level of education the more  Indonesia will 
benefit from foreign MNEs. The same can be said about the technological capacity in 
Indonesia. A higher technological capacity would  encourages  foreign MNEs to upgrade 
production  to  higher  value  added  activities  in  Indonesia,  rather  than  placing  such   24 
production  in  other  countries,  and  it  would  also  increase  spillovers  by  facilitating 
knowledge transfers from MNEs to local firms.  
Technological capability is another area where there seems to be large potentials 
for improvements, which would be positive for attracting FDI. Indonesian technology 
policies before the Asian crisis were dominated by large high-tech projects in aircraft, 
shipbuilding,  railroads,  telecommunications,  electronics,  steel  and  machinery.  Poor 
management and a weak scientific and engineering infrastructure made most of these 
projects  fail (e.g. McKendrick, 1992;  Hill, 1995;  Hill and Thee, 1998; Okamoto and 
Sjöholm, 2003). High-tech projects were mostly abandoned after the crisis but no new 
technology policy has emerged in its place. As a result, Indonesia remains at the bottom 
of the technology ladder in the region. One indication of the poor state of technology 
development and technology capability, or perhaps one of the causes, is the very low 
investment in research and development. The figures shown in Table 9 show that, firstly, 
R&D as a share of GDP is substantially lower in Indonesia than in the other included 
countries. Secondly, the share of R&D has declined in Indonesia between 2000 and 2005, 
whereas it has increased in all other countries.  
 Another indication of technological capabilities is the extent to which foreign 
investors choose to perform R&D in their Indonesian affiliates. An indication of that 
judgment on the part of U.S. multinational firms is given in Table 9. On average, in 2004, 
U.S.  firms‘  affiliates  in  developing  Asia  spent  on  R&D  about  11  percent  of  their 
expenditures for employee compensation.  The highest ratios among these countries were 
about 19 percent in Singapore and Taiwan. In contrast, affiliates in Indonesia spent on 
R&D an amount equal to only 0.6 percent of their employee compensation, far below the   25 
ratios in any other country in the region.  The next lowest share was in Thailand, where it 
was three times as high as in Indonesia.  The same stark contrasts can be seen for R&D 
expenditures per employee, 5 or 6 thousand dollars per employee in the highest countries, 
Singapore and Taiwan, but only $80 per employee in Indonesia.  
 
      -- Table 9 about here -- 
 
Infrastructure is a related issue affecting the interest of foreign multinational firms 
to  locate in  Indonesia.  The importance of infrastructure is  clear from the East  Asian 
experience where many countries have used improvements to infrastructure deliberately 
to attract foreign firms and to integrate in international production networks. It is also 
clear that many East Asian countries continue to invest heavily in infrastructure and that 
such investments increased further in for instance China after the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in 2008.  
Unfortunately, infrastructure is poor in Indonesia. A report on Indonesia in The 
Economist  in 2009 quoted a Jakarta bank  executive as  saying that  infrastructure had 
become the top obstacle to doing business in Indonesia among his banks‘ clients. 
  
 ―…roads,  air-  and  seaports  are  inadequate…Electricity  generation  lags 
demand…Only  18%  of  the  population  have  piped  water  and  only  2.5%  are 
connected  to  a  sewer  system…Export  industries  are  hindered  by  a  lack  of 
ports…‖ (The Economist, September 12, 2009, pp. 11-12). 
    26 
The crisis in the late 1990‘s had a negative effect on investments in infrastructure. 
However, investments remained very low even after the crisis was over. In 2010, The 
Global  Competitiveness  Report  ranked  Indonesia  only  as  number  96  in  terms  of  the 
quality of infrastructure, out of 133 included countries. Some signs of an improvement 
came in 2009 when the government tried to balance a large drop in external demand by 
launching  a  program  for  major  infrastructure  investments  (Resosudarmo  and  Yusuf, 
2009). However, insufficient public funding is only one of many factors that restrain 
infrastructure development. Other problems that will be difficult to solve include a lack 
of  technical  capabilities  at  responsible  local  governments,  poor  coordination  between 
central and local governments and between different regions, and large problems with 
land acquisitions (Kong and Ramayandi, 2008).  
FDI might be one way to improve infrastructure. Investments by foreign firms in 
infrastructure,  and  also  in  utilities,  finance,  construction  and  other  non-tradables,  are 
affected  by  various  institutional  factors  such  as  competition  and  pricing  policies. 
Complex regulations are often required to attract investments in these sectors. Indonesia 
has a mixed history in dealing with inward investments in infrastructure projects (Wells 
and  Ahmed,  2006).  Lack  of  administrative  capacity,  poor  regulatory  structures  and 
corruption are some of the main causes of failing investments in infrastructure. Wells 
(2007) suggest some policies to improve upon the investment regime: a closer look at 
international  best  practices,  a  ban  on  equity  arrangements  where  importantly  placed 
Indonesians get a share of foreign investments, and an institutional arrangement where 
only one government agency has the full responsibility to negotiate and make agreements 
with foreign investors in infrastructure projects.   27 
The quality of institutions is perhaps the most important determinant to FDI. In a 
survey of Japanese firms that chose various countries as prospective sites for their foreign 
manufacturing locations, over 80 percent of those choosing Indonesia listed ―Political and 
Social Environment‖ as a weak point, far more than for any other location (Kimura and 
Ando, 2006, Table 2.8).  Indonesia has traditionally been seen as having some of the 
world‘s most corrupt institutions (Butt, 2009). The figures in Table 4 supports this view.
7 
In a comment  on corruption in Indonesia in 2008, Transparency International (2008) 
notes  that  Indonesia  is  plagued  by  rampant  corruption,  but  with  some  signs  of 
improvements during recent years. Despite this possible slight improvement, corruption 
remains a real problem and some recent reports indicate new setbacks when the police 
force, the parliament, and the attorney general‘s office have been obstructing the work of 
the anti-corruption commission (Patunru and von Luebke, 2010). 
It  is  difficult  to  know  exactly  how  negative  corruption  is  for  FDI  inflows  to 
Indonesia but there are ample of anecdotal stories of foreign firms who do not invest in 
Indonesia  for  fear  that  corruption  will  lead  to  bad-will  or  with  problems  with  home 
country authorities (e.g. Wells, 2007, p. 354).  
There are also reasons why the changing nature of corruption might be negative. 
Corruption was high under the New Order regime but it was also highly institutionalized 
and predictable: once a standard contribution to the Suharto family or its closest allies 
had been made, the regime made sure that the foreign firms‘ activities were not disturbed 
(World Bank, 2003; Lee and Oh, 2007)). Corruption after Suharto is mainly caused by 
local  governments‘  regulations  (Henderson  and  Kuncoro,  2004).  Corruption  differs 
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between provinces  and  districts,  is  highly  arbitrarily,  and therefore more difficult  for 
foreign multinationals to deal with. 
As previously said, the business environment is generally seen to be poorer in 
Indonesia than in other East Asian countries. For instance, the Foreign Policy magazine 
Globalization Index is an indicator of investors‘ perception of the investment climate in 
different  countries  and  are  often  said  to  be  closely  watched  by  the  international 
community.
8 Indonesia was ranked as number 86 out of 156 countries and behind all 
included countries in East Asia except Cambodia and Vietnam. 
The government has since 2006 tried to reform the investment climate for foreign 
firms. Some reforms of par ticular importance  are  the equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic investors and the streamlined application procedures for investment approvals 
(Lindblad and Thee, 2007). However, 25 sectors are closed to foreign firms. More 
importantly, Indonesia still uses ownership sharing requirements for foreign investments 
(Takii and Ramstetter, 2007).  Ownership sharing  has been abandoned in many other 
countries,  since  they  don‘t  provide  any  additional  benefits  to  the  host  economy,  and 
might deter inflows of FDI (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999). Foreign firms that are afraid 
of losing their technologies to domestic actors, will think twice before they engage in a 
joint venture with local actors.   
The problems for foreign firms are often caused by local authorities. With the 
decentralization  of  Indonesia  in  2001,  the  quality  of  public  policies  and  economic 
governance differ markedly across regions in Indonesia. Some local governments have 
been encouraging local and foreign firms, whereas many others have constrained firms 
                                                 
8 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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by imprudent taxation, corruption and inefficient bureaucracy (von Luebke, 2009). Good 
local  leadership  seems  to  make  a  very  big  difference  in  fostering  a  good  business 
environment. For instance, business licenses could be obtained in only two days for only 
Rp 5,000 in Yogyakarta, compared to 20 days in Medan and at a cost of Rp 477,000 in 
Bandung.  Moreover,  good  local  leadership  in  the  west  Sumatran  district  Solok  has 
avoided poor regulations and corruption, and has significantly improved upon the private 
sector business environment.
9 
As discussed in the paper, openness to trade is another important determinant of 
FDI, especially for multinational firms with vertically integrated production chains. The 
trade  regime  in  Indonesia  deteriorated  after  the  crisi s  in  1997 -98  with  increased 
corruption at the customs services and with increased time and costs for clearing goods  
(Athukorala, 2002). In recent years, the situation seems to be improving. One of the 
included criteria in the  World Bank‘s doing business survey is trading across borders, 
which is defined as the documents, time and cost to export and import. Indonesia is 
ranked as number 45, hence substantially better than its average ranking of 122. It is also 
better than the ranking of many other countries in the region, and about the same ranking 
as China (rank 44). A slightly worrying sign, however, is that Indonesia dropped from 
rank 40 in 2007.  Poor integration in the international economy is presumably one reason 
why  Indonesia  in  not  participating  in  international  production  networks  to  the  same 
extent as many other East Asian countries.
10  
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10 There are exceptions. A relative large number of foreign electronic firms have located themselves in the 
Export Processing Zones Bintan and Batam islands. These islands are located just half an hour by speed 
boat from Singapore and are a part of the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle (Thambipillai, 1998).    30 
Furthermore,  it  is  likely  that  historical  poor  policies  explain  part  of  the 
development. It is here interesting to note that Indonesia was an early receiver of foreign 
multinational firms in electronics. For instance, Fairchild and National Semiconductor 
established plants  in  Indonesia in  the early 1970‘s. However, both  firms  closed their 
operations in Indonesia in the 1980‘s because of an unfavorable business environment 
(Thee and Pangestu, 1998, p. 223).  
   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
FDI has been important in East Asia‘s economic development. Multinational firms have 
contributed to host country development by bringing in new technologies and providing 
access  to  foreign markets.  The benefits  have become increasingly obvious  for policy 
makers over time and explain the changing attitude towards FDI in East Asia: from a 
negative view where most policies aimed at keeping foreign firms out, to a situation 
where substantial resources are spent on attracting foreign firms.  
Multinational firms have responded to the policy changes and invested heavily in 
the  region.  Production  networks,  where  different  parts  of  multinationals‘  production 
chain are located in affiliates in different countries, seem to be particularly important in 
East Asia.  
Indonesia has not fully participated in this development and attracts less FDI than 
what could be expected from its size and growth, particularly in the periods up to 1990 
and in recent years. This coincides with a relative restrictive FDI regime and with later 
failures  to  continue  with  liberalizations.  In  the  1990‘s,  when  the  FDI  regime  was 
substantially liberalized, FDI inflows were larger.   31 
 A survey of the literature shows that FDI has increased economic growth, wages, 
export, and employment in the Indonesian economy.  What could be done if Indonesia 
wished to attract more FDI? As global and regional competition for FDI has increased, an 
FDI regime and an economic environment that were sufficient for attracting FDI some 
years ago are not sufficient today.  
An  analysis  of  determinants  of  FDI  in  East  Asia  gives  some  guidance:  good 
institutions, a skilled workforce, and openness to trade. Some of these are factors where 
Indonesia has  shown improvements  in recent  years. These improvements, if they  are 
continued  and  intensified,  will  presumably  make  Indonesia  more  attractive  for 
multinational  firms,  although  it  will  take  time  before  the  improvements  have  more 
widespread impact on the economy.  
  It is important to recognize that the business environment is poorer than in many 
other  East  Asian  countries.  Indonesian  institutions  need  to  be  improved  further. 
Corruption is one area with some small signs of improvements, but where the situation 
remains worse than in most other countries in East Asia. Poor institutions and corruption 
increase the costs of production. Multinational firms that can choose between different 
locations will tend to stay out of Indonesia unless these issues are addressed. To end the 
paper on a positive note, there are some provinces that in recent years have been able to 
implement good policies and improve local institutions. To use these good examples for 
reforms and changes at a national level would increase inflows of FDI and thereby be 
fruitful for the continued development of Indonesia. 
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Inflows of FDI to Developing East Asia 1970-2009
 
Data:   The website of UNCTAD; 
  Until 2008, the data are from Interactive database 
  http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3199&lang=1 
  For 2009, UNCTAD( 2010) 
  http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13423&intItemID=2068&l





TABLE 1 The Stock of Inward FDI as Percent of GDP 
 
Notes:  For China/Hong Kong, the ratios are calculated by dividing the sum of FDI stocks 
of the two economies by the sum of GDP, which are obtained from International 
Financial Statistics, IMF. GDP reported in national currency is converted into US 
dollars by using the exchange rates reported by IMF (annual average). This 
procedure exaggerates the combined ratio because double counting of FDI is not 
eliminated, but the gross exaggeration of the Hong Kong ratio is eliminated. 
Data:  The website of UNCTAD; 
  Until 2008, the data are from Interactive database 
  http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3199&lang=1 
  For 2009, UNCTAD( 2010) and web annex tables 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13423&intItemID=2068&l
ang=1&mode=downloads 








  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2009 
China/Hong Kong  53.37  55.01  46.33  36.47  47.44  32.95  27.06 
          Taiwan  5.69  4.62  5.91  5.75  6.08  12.13  12.75 
          Indonesia   5.73  5.98  6.95  9.32  15.20  14.41  13.48 
          Korea  1.78  1.87  1.97  1.84  7.45  13.25  13.31 
          Malaysia  20.33  22.80  22.57  31.15  56.24  32.23  39.01 
          Philippines  2.82  5.98  10.22  13.69  23.92  15.17  14.63 
          Singapore  45.66  60.03  82.57  78.21  119.26  162.44  193.98 
          Thailand  3.03  5.14  9.66  10.53  24.38  34.24  37.52 
          Viet Nam  59.10  30.25  25.49  34.48  66.07  58.93  51.93 
               
     Northeast Asia  41.85  38.91  25.90  20.96  32.11  26.01  25.35 
      Southeast Asia  9.44  12.54  18.09  22.46  44.47  44.80  46.34   39 
 
 




1984  1985-1989  1990- 1994  1995-1999  2000-2004  2005-2008 
China/Hong Kong  2.30  4.35  10.26  13.63  12.58  9.27 
Taiwan  1.19  3.52  2.19  2.49  3.78  6.59 
Indonesia  0.88  1.70  3.93  5.69  -2.41  7.12 
Korea  0.40  1.18  0.60  2.57  3.37  2.03 
Malaysia  12.59  9.87  19.99  16.22  11.56  18.42
b 
Philippines  2.04  7.23  7.90  8.56  7.25  11.68 
Singapore  18.86  29.22  27.87  38.96  62.72  63.66 
Thailand  2.67  4.55  4.33  8.91  13.90  14.53 
Vietnam  -  0.16 
c  34.36  26.00  11.24  17.84 
     
Northeast Asia 
d  1.79  3.46  5.90  9.57  10.06  8.07 
Southeast Asia 
d  5.31  7.16  10.33  15.28  15.46  18.69 
 
Source: The website of UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment database 
  The website of World Bank, World databank 
  The website of National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan) 
Note: 
a The ratio of the period-sum of FDI inflow to the period-sum of gross capital 
formation. 
b 2005 to 2007.  
   
c 1986 to 1989. 
The figures are calculated as the ratio as the period-sum of FDI inflow to the 
period-sum of gross capital formation.  
Countries other than those listed above were dropped from the aggregation if the 
data on their FDI inflows or gross capital formation were not available. The effect 
on the aggregate ratios was small. 
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TABLE 3 The regional averages and country levels of 
the ranking of the Ease of Doing Business 
 
  2006  2008  2010 
China  108  90  89 
Hong Kong  6  4  3 
Taiwan  43  58  46 
Indonesia  131  127  122 
Korea  23  22  19 
Malaysia  25  25  23 
Philippines  121  136  144 
Singapore  2  1  1 
Thailand  19  19  12 
Vietnam  98  87  93 
       
Northeast Asia  45  44  40 
Southeast Asia  66  66  65 
Latin America  91  99  105 
Africa  130  136  137 
 
Source: World Bank (2007b) and  (2009); the website of World Bank 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
Note: In 2007, 2009, and, 2010, Doing Business reports adjusted the ranking of the ease 
of doing business of the previous years for changes in methodology, data corrections, and 
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TABLE 4 The Corruption Perceptions Index in Developing Regions. 
  2001  2009 
China  3.5  3.6 
Hong Kong  7.9  8.2 
Taiwan  5.9  5.6 
Indonesia  1.9  2.8 
Korea  4.2  5.5 
Malaysia  5.0  4.5 
Philippines  2.9  2.4 
Singapore  9.2  9.2 
Thailand  3.2  3.4 
Vietnam  2.6  2.7 
     
     
Northeast Asia  5.38  5.73 
Southeast Asia  4.13  4.17 
Latin America  3.75  3.56 
Africa  3.24  2.85 
 
Source: the website of Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/ 
 
Northeast Asia; China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan 
 
Southeast Asia; Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam 
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Table 5 Ratio of Actual Inward FDI Stock to Predicted Stock
a, 1980-005 
















             
China
a  3.46  2.89  1.95  2.10  1.34  1.19 
Indonesia  0.27  0.31  0.36  0.52  0.27  0.40 
Korea  0.10  0.12  0.34  0.25  0.45  1.04 
Malaysia  0.88  1.36  1.77  1.08  0.99  0.57 
Philippines  0.11  0.32  0.54  1.05  0.80  0.37 
Singapore  0.31  0.47  1.03  1.43  1.27  1.72 
Taiwan  0.28  0.33  1.29  0.66  0.52  0.76 
Thailand  0.13  0.23  1.06  0.68  0.62  1.00 
             
 
aPredicted from Equation (1) 
bIncluding Hong Kong 
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TABLE 6 Shares of Industries in Employment by All Nonbank Affiliates of US Parents in 2007. 
      Indonesia  China  Hong Kong  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
All industries  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Mining  23.4 ~ 
 33.0 
0.4 ~ 
 0.6  0  0  2.1  0.0  1.2  0  1.6 
Utilities  0.6  0.1  0.4 ~  
0.8  0  0  0.4 ~  
0.8  0  0  0 
Manuf.   Total  55.7  61.2  20.0 ~ 
 40.0  60.4  72.4  59.1  53.2  35.8  71.7 
    Food  5.2  3.2 ~ 
 6.3  0.2  0.8 ~  
2.1  0.8  17.4  0.3  0.6  8.6 
    Chemicals  9.4  6.3 ~ 
 12.6  1.8  4.2  5.0  4.4  4.8  4.1  6.1 
    Primary and 
 fabric. Metals  0.6  2.5  0.6  1.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  1.0  0.6 
    Machinery  0.4  5.7  1.6  4.8  1.3  0.3  4.0  2.3  1.7 ~  
3.4 
    Comp. and elect. 
 Prod.  0.9  17.8  3.5  13.6  52.1  20.6  18.0 ~ 
36.0 
9.6 ~ 
24.0  23.2 
    Elect. Equip., appl., 
 and components. 
0.9 ~  
2.3  5.4  4.0 ~ 
 8.0 




3.9 ~  
7.9  1.7  4.8 ~ 
9.6  0.6 
    Transp. equip.  1.0  6.3~  
12.6  0.0  20.5 ~  
41.1  1.3  3.9 ~  
7.9  3.7  2.5  5.5 
    Other   37.2 ~ 
 35.8  
0.0 ~  
14.0  
4.4 ~  
28.4 












Wholesale trade  2.0  3.2 ~  
6.3  13.5  7.2  6.5  2.6  11.4  11.8  5.2 
Information  0.9 ~  
2.3  1.2  3.2  1.9  0.7  0.5  4.0  2.0  0.3 
Finance (except dep. Inst.) and insur.  2.6  0.7  8.1  4.1 ~ 
 8.2  2.2  2.0 ~  
3.9  4.3  9.6 ~ 
24.0  4.1 
Prof., sci., and tech. serv.  0.7  1.6  7.3  4.6  2.9  14.9  7.3  4.8 ~ 
9.6  1.2 
Other industries  4.7 ~ 
 9.3  29.9  20.0 ~  
40.0 
8.2 ~  
20.5  13.4  19.9  18.8  24.0 ~ 
47.9  16.1   44 
Source: US BEA (2009). Note: 0 indicates fewer than 500 employees. Some shares, such as for Mining in Indonesia, can only be 
shown as ranges, because the numbers are suppressed in the source. 
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TABLE 7 The Percent of Sales outside the Host Country by Majority-Owned Foreign 
Manufacturing Affiliates of US parents in 2004. 
Indonesia  20.93 
China  31.13 
Hong Kong  50.93 
Korea  14.95 
Malaysia  72.19 
Philippines  69.24 
Singapore  59.90 
Taiwan  41.40 
Thailand  44.10 
Data:   The website of the BEA; US Direct Investment Abroad 2004 Final Benchmark 
Data 
Note:  Sales outside the host country are total sales by affiliates minus local sales by 
affiliates.   46 
 
 
TABLE 8 Educational Attainment of the Total Population,  
15 and over in East Asian Countries 
    Completion    Ratio 
Tertiary/   
  No 
Schooling  Secondary  Tertiary    Secondary  Average Year 
of Schooling 
Indonesia  17.3  22.8  1.4    0.06  6.24 
China  6.5  46.0  5.2    0.11  8.17 
Hong 
Kong  12.5  39.5  6.7    0.17  10.37 
Korea  3.6  37.8  16.2    0.43  11.85 
Malaysia  8.5  38.9  4.7    0.12  10.14 
Philippines  4.2  21.3  22.9    1.08  8.97 
Singapore  8.2  22.3  10.7    0.48  9.14 
Taiwan  2.4  32.5  10.2    0.31  11.34 
Thailand  11.7  14.6  11.1    0.76  7.50 
Source: Barro-Lee web site (http://barrolee.com) and Barro and Lee (2010). 
 
 





R&D as a share 
of GDP 





R&D in US$ per 
employee in US majority 
affiliates 
  2000  2005  2004  2004 
China  0.90  1.33  14.9  1,492 
Hong Kong  --  --  5.7  1,766 
Indonesia  0.07  0.05  0.6  80 
Malaysia  0.49  --  11.2  1,484 
Philippines  --  0.12  6.7  521 
Korea  2.39  2.98  9.6  3,462 
Singapore  1.88  2.30  19.0  6,394 
Taiwan  --  --  19.3  4,847 
Thailand  0.25  0.23  2.1  200 
Source: R&D as a share of GDP from UNESCO 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/download.aspx 
R&D in US affiliates from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008), Tables III.J1, 
III.H5, and III.H3.    47 
APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 Studies comparing foreign and domestic plants in Indonesian Manufacturing. 




Takii (2004)  1995  TFP  Foreign firms have high 
productivity. Wholly 
foreign owned relatively 






1975-2001  Labor 
productivity 
Foreign firms have high 
productivity. The 










1983-1996  TFP  Foreign acquisitions of 
domestic plants increase 
productivity. 













1996  Export  Foreign firms relatively 
able to start export. 
Sjöholm and 
Takii (2008) 
1990-2000  Export  Foreign firms relatively 





1996  Wages per 
employee 





1975-1999  Wages per 
employee 





1975-2005  Growth in 
employment 
Foreign firms have high 
growth in employment. 
Note: TFP – Total Factor Productivity. 
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TABLE A2 Studies on Spillovers from FDI in Indonesian Manufacturing. 



























































1988-96  Output   Positive 
spillovers  
Takii (2009)  1990-1995  Value added, 
wages 
Positive 
spillovers  
 